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DON'T TRAIN YOUR EMPLOYEES AND
CANCEL YOUR "1-800" HARASSMENT
HOTLINE: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
AND CORRECTION OF THE FLAWS IN THE






In two recent workplace sexual harassment decisions, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton' and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellertz,2 the
United States Supreme Court articulated a two-prong affirmative
defense that limits employer liability for sexual harassment in certain
circumstances. An employer may now avoid vicarious liability for
actions of a supervisor that create a hostile work environment by
proving that: (1) the employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) the
plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."3
Legal scholars were quick to predict how lower courts would apply
this novel affirmative defense.4 The tide of academic commentary
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1. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
2. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
3. Id. at 745.
4. Numerous articles came in the wake of the Court's decisions that discuss the
implications of its ruling. See, eg., Steven H. Aden, "Harm in Asking": A Reply to
Eugene Scalia and an Analysis of the Paradigm Shift in the Supreme Court's Title VII
Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 477 (1999); Louis
P. DiLorenzo & Laura H. Harshbarger, Employer Liability for Supervisor
Harassment After Ellerth and Faragher, 6 Duke J. Gender L & Pol'y 3 (1999); Estelle
D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers' Paradox in
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could not, however, fully elucidate the treatment of this defense by
the lower courts because academics published most of the existing
scholarship before a sufficient number of judicial opinions applying
the twin-pronged affirmative defense appeared. Consequently, these
scholars based their conclusions on a limited number of decisions, and
could not perform statistical analyses of the cases. Eighteen months
after the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the large number of cases
applying the affirmative defense warrants statistical analyses and
supports at least preliminary assessments. In this article, we analyze
the first seventy-two post-Ellerth and Faragher opinions involving
employers' summary judgment motions that include affirmative
defenses in response to allegations of sexual harassment in the
workplace. Through our analyses, we aim to shed light on how lower
courts thus far have construed the two-pronged affirmative defense.
In so doing, we seek to assess the early predictions' accuracy.
After describing the Court's decisions and briefly reviewing the
relevant literature, this article unfolds into two parts. In the first, we
present statistical analyses of factors that influenced the courts'
application of the two-part affirmative defense. In the second, we
turn to the courts' decisions and critically examine their practical
effects. Our statistical analyses consider employer- and employee-
related variables germane to the affirmative defense. They reveal that
employer-related factors heavily influence the courts' construction of
both the first and second prongs. Somewhat surprising is the degree
to which courts look to employer conduct when they characterize
employee conduct.
Our content analyses of the opinions reveal that many of the
judicial opinions are result-oriented. Simply put, the judicial opinions
do not evidence a desire to punish an employer that has acted
responsibly and reasonably. Accordingly, to reward an employer who
responds adequately to a harassment complaint, courts often find that
the complaining employee acted "unreasonably" as a matter of law,
even when such a determination may merit a more thorough review of
the facts of the case. Indeed, courts have held employees to be
unreasonable for failing to report harassment within a month after the
allegedly harassing behavior began.' Moreover, employees who do
not report are almost always found to have acted unreasonably.6
Our analyses of the initial wave of lower court decisions applying
the recently articulated affirmative defense raise important legal and
policy questions. One question is whether the result-oriented
Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment-A Proposed Way Out, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1517 (1999); B. Glenn George, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment: The Buck Stops Where?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Moore v. Sam's Club, 55 F. Supp. 2d 177, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
6. See, e.g., Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., No. C98-0378, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5425,
at *15 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 13, 1999).
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holdings establish a perverse incentive for employers seeking to avoid
liability, and create unacceptable barriers and requirements for
employees who may need to seek redress for compensable behavior at
the workplace. Specifically, employers seeking to limit liability in
light of lower courts' application of Ellerth and Faragher should
exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a court, but not enough
to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain of
workplace harassment. Employees, on the other hand, must report
harassment before they might be ready to do so, or perhaps, before a
claim ripens. Because of the high costs associated with investigating
claims and the potentially devastating effects that a premature claim
of sexual harassment may have on a supervisor, this affirmative
defense generates undesirable incentives. Employers who exercise
more care are potentially worse off from a liability perspective than
employers who exercise less care. Additionally, in many instances
employees must either report earlier than they would prefer or else
risk losing their claims entirely.
To minimize these undesirable results, we propose a new standard
for the affirmative defense that minimizes the negative incentives and
allows employees to take the necessary time before reporting the
harassment without fear of forfeiting their claims. We recommend
that courts focus exclusively on the employers' actions when they
determine whether the employer satisfies the Ellerth and Faragher
affirmative defense. More specifically, this article proposes that
employers should be able to avoid liability if they can prove that they
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly to correct any
sexual harassment. In contrast, the court should not consider the
employee's reasonableness, or lack thereof, on a motion for summary
judgment.
I. ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
In the summer of 1998, the Supreme Court articulated new
standards for employer vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases.
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth7 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,8 the Court held that employers are liable for actions of
supervisors who engage in either quid pro quo sexual harassment or
hostile-environment sexual harassment, regardless of whether they
knew, or should have known, of the alleged conduct.' Employers
cannot, under Ellerth and Faragher, escape liability in the quid pro
quo context. In hostile-environment cases, however, employers can
avoid liability created by supervisors if they satisfy a newly created
7. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
8. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
9. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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affirmative defense.10 To satisfy the defense, employers must prove:
(1) "that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) "that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.""
The legal community reacted swiftly and heatedly to this affirmative
defense, and almost all commentators agreed that the holdings were
ambiguous because neither Ellerth nor Faragher defined "reasonable
care."12  Similarly, the Supreme Court did not articulate the
circumstances in which it would be unreasonable for an employee to
"fail[] to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. ' 13 Predictably,
scholars began to hypothesize about how lower courts would
implement this defense. 4  Commentators predicted that: (1)
employers would not prevail in summary judgment motions;5 (2)
employees who reported alleged harassment would always prevail; 16
(3) employees who did not report would survive summary judgment; 7
and (4) mere maintenance and promulgation of a sexual harassment
policy would be insufficient for employers attempting to meet the
"reasonable care" standard." Regrettably, many commentators
weighed in before courts had sufficient opportunities to apply the
affirmative defense. Consequently, early scholarly commentary, both
positive and negative, had little actual case law or empirical evidence
on which to ground its theories and predictions. Indeed, much of
what these commentators predicted has not come to pass.
By waiting eighteen months before beginning our analyses, our
stud) benefits from a broader and more complete picture to evaluate
how courts have applied the affirmative defense. Between June, 1998,
and January, 2000, employers filed seventy-two motions for summary
10. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
11. Id. at 807. The Court explained this defense by asserting that "proof that an
employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law." Id. The Court did not explain,
however, how an employer could satisfy this burden without a policy. With regard to
the employee's actions, the Court again was less than exact:
And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden under the second element of the defense.
Id. at 807-08.
12- See, e.g., DiLorenzo & Harshbarger, supra note 4, at 21-22.
13. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
14. See, e.g., DiLorenzo & Harshbarger, supra note 4, at 13-14.
15. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 1548.
16. Id. at 1549-50.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1554-55.
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judgment in which they argued that a hostile-environment case should
be dismissed because the employer satisfied, as a matter of law, the
affirmative defense. 9 Our study focuses on how courts analyze the
standard of reasonableness under both prongs.
We approach this question from an empirical perspective, which
allows us to identify behaviors that constitute both reasonable care on
an employer's behalf and an unreasonable failure by an employee to
report harassment or avoid harm. Our analyses help us identify
systematically several approaches taken by courts as they
operationalized the affirmative defense. We place the cases into one
of several classifications that reflect the various approaches taken by
the courts in applying the defense. By examining the frequency and
correlative nature of these classifications, we identify the
circumstances in which employers successfully raised the defense, as
well as instances in which employees successfully defeated it.
Part II of this article provides a general review of the limited
literature addressing the affirmative defense and examines various
predictions as to how the defense would be applied by the courts. In
Part III, we describe our data, methodology, and model. Part IV
presents the results from our statistical analyses of the seventy-two
cases. In Part V, we discuss results from our content analysis of the
post-Ellerth and Faragher decisions, and their implications.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A detailed discussion of the history and development of sexual
harassment in the workplace exceeds this article's scope. It is
important to note, however, that no federal statute expressly and
squarely addresses-let alone prohibits-sexual harassment in the
workplace. Moreover, scholars generally agree that when Congress
enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2" it did not
contemplate that the statute's prohibition against discrimination based
on sex would create a cause of action for employees who were
subjected to unwanted sexual advances without suffering any tangible
loss.21 Instead, Professor Catherine MacKinnon is credited with
originating the legal prohibition against sexual harassment.
19. For a discussion of possible motivations for courts' decisions to grant summary
judgment motions, see Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Sammary Judgment in
Hostile Environment Cases, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 71, 73 (1999) (identifying a desire
to reduce a bulging caseload of hostile environment cases).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-4.
21. See, e.g., Michelle Angelone, Same-Sex Harassment Claims Under Title VII."
Quick v. Donaldson Co. Breathes New Life into the Post-Garcia State of the Law, 9 U.
Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 61, 76-79 (1997) (discussing several courts' interpretation of
Congressional intent underlying sexual discrimination): Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational
Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 Cal, L Rev. 1151, 1166 (1995)
(discussing the Supreme Court's interpretation of congressional intent embodied in
Title VII's protection against sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
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In 1979, Professor MacKinnon coined the term "sexual harassment"
with the publication of Sexual Harassment of Working Women 2 and
fueled the creation of a cause of action. In her work, MacKinnon
defined sexual harassment, in its broadest sense, as the "unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power."'  The influence of her work on both courts and
scholars was swift, enduring, and profound. 4
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") expanded its "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex" under Title VII to include sexual harassment. 5 After the EEOC
published its guidelines, courts routinely held that hostile-
environment sexual harassment did in fact create a cause of action.26
In the 1986 case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 7 the Supreme
Court put to rest any lingering questions concerning the legal efficacy
of MacKinnon's hostile-environment theory by ruling that sexual
harassment created a Title VII violation and thereby a legal cause of
action.
Even though the Meritor Court established the unlawfulness of
sexual harassment, its opinion left open questions regarding the
definition of the cause of action, and employers' vicarious liability for
477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986)). "Tangible" losses occur when there is a material change in
employment, such as termination, failure to promote, demotion, or a change in
benefits. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,760-63 (1998).
22. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of
Sex Discrimination (1979); see also Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of
Sexual Harassment, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1169, 1169-70 (1998) (discussing Professor
MacKinnon's influential role in the development of sexual discrimination law).
23. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 1; see also DiLorenzo & Harshbarger, supra
note 4, at 4 n.8.
24. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference
Method Makes, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (1989) (reviewing all of Professor MacKinnon's
work and discussing its profound influence on legal doctrine and practice).
25. The EEOC Guidelines define quid pro quo harassment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature... when (1) submission to such conduct
is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, [or] (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual ....
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1985).
26. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982);
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement
that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the
privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning
and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Id. at 902; see also Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F.
Supp. 780,784 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986), affig Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
28. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
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supervisors' actions.29 Meritor holds that sexual harassment manifests
itself in two forms: (1) quid pro quo, and (2) hostile environment.u
"Quid pro quo" is readily defined as wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions of employment which a supervisor or employer predicates
on the acquiescence of unwanted sexual favors.3 Quid pro quo
harassment occurs when, for example, an employer or supervisor
states to an employee, "sleep with me or you are fired."' -
Under the Meritor standard, a plaintiffs claim need not be based
solely on economic loss to advance a successful sexual harassment
complaint.33 Instead, Meritor held that a plaintiff could make out a
case of so-called "hostile environment" discrimination if the employee
was forced to endure unwelcome sexual conduct sufficiently severe or
pervasive enough "to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."' To
clarify this standard, which reflects the EEOC's definition of hostile
environment,35 the Court made clear that "not all workplace conduct
that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or
privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII. '  For
example, the Court explained that a "'mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee'
would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] sufficiently
significant degree [so as] to violate Title VII."37 Unfortunately, these
terms remain far from clear, and lower courts struggle to determine
what constitutes a hostile environment. s
The Supreme Court took up this issue in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.39 The question before the Court in Harris was whether a plaintiff
had to prove that the harassment seriously affected his or her
29. See generally id
30. Id. at 62.
31. See id.
32. In Ellerth, the Court clarified quid pro quo cases by holding that employees
had to prove that they suffered a tangible loss in order to make the claim. See
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,753-54 (1998).
33. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-67. The Meritor decision differed from prior
courts' approaches in this regard. In earlier cases, courts denied recovery to plaintiffs
unable to prove any tangible impact on usual terms of employment such as pay or
promotions. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. & Elec. Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557
(D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp.
233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (quoting Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,
163 (D. Ariz. 1975)) (labeling extension of liability for sexual harassment as
"ludicrous"), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
34. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971)); Henson, 682 F.2d. at 904 (bracketed text in original).
35. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66.
36. Id. at 67.
37. Id. (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
3& See George, supra note 4, at 6-7.
39. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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psychological well-being.4" The Court rejected this proposition, and
instead held that while Title VII bars conduct that would seriously
affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, such conduct
does not "mark the boundary of what is actionable."'" Thus, as long
as the environment "would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived,
as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically
injurious."" The Court continued by acknowledging that "[t]his is
not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test."43 The
Court attempted to clarify its holding by stating that the conduct has
to be severe and pervasive from both a subjective and objective
perspective.' Nonetheless, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
stated that he did not find the Court's standard to be a clear one.45
Justice Scalia went on to note, however, that he "know[s] of no
alternative to the course the Court today has taken."46
Difficulties with determining what type of conduct qualifies as
unlawful sexual harassment continue to vex academicians, legal
scholars, and practitioners. This uncertainty helps spawn numerous
theories as to what is, and why people engage in, sexual harassment.
Professor Kathryn Abrams outlines two such scholarly treatments
in her article, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment.47 She
explains that prior to 1980, scholars focused on the wrongfulness of
sexual harassment.4" Between 1980 and the 1986 Meritor decision,
legal scholarship's focus turned to considering what constitutes sexual
harassment.4 9 After Meritor, the focus again shifted to explaining how
courts and employers should apply the new standards. 0  More
recently, Professor Abrams argues that in the year prior to Ellerth, the
focus of legal scholarship came full circle and again addressed the
"wrongs" of sexual harassment."
The work of Professor Abrams and numerous other scholars who
focus on the "wrongs" of sexual harassment is extremely helpful,
relevant, and provocative. Such work does not, however, constitute
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 22.
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 23.
45. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. Abrams, supra note 22, at 1171.
48- Id. at 1169-70.
49. Id. at 1170.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 1171. Professor Abrams addresses the leading scholarship on sexual
harassment. Specifically, she analyzes Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment
With Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With
Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691 (1997); and Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptionalizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683 (1998). Abrams, supra
note 22. at 1171 & n.7.
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the only current stream of sexual harassment legal scholarship. The
Ellerth and Faragher opinions invigorate those who focus on the
"how" of sexual harassment; these new standards, which attempt to
clarify Meritor, leave many questions unanswered, and there is
growing need to explore how the law should be applied.
The Ellerth and Faragher decisions have already fueled
considerable commentary.' As previously described, however,
because the affirmative defense has only been in effect since June,
1998, most of the existing scholarship reviews either a small number of
cases or no cases at all. Thus, many of the articles that endeavor to
explain the courts' holdings identify questions left unanswered by the
rulings and predict legal outcomes within a data vacuum."3
Although the affirmative defense's first prong pivots on a
reasonableness inquiry, it is unclear what constitutes "reasonable
care" in the employment context. Is an employer's maintenance and
distribution of a harassment policy enough? Some scholars argue that
it is not and propose that to exercise reasonable care employers must
also provide, for example, training to both employees and
supervisors.' If this is so, however, how much training is sufficient?
52. See, e.g., articles cited in note 4, supra.
53. See, eg., id.
54. Paul Buchanan and Courtney Wiswall argue as follows:
Of course, courts will likely require more than the mere existence of a well-
drafted and effectively promulgated written policy to support a finding that
an employer exercised reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing
behavior. Employers should regularly conduct training to educate employees
about harassment and company policies. Employers may wish to have live or
video presentations regarding harassment for every new employee at the
commencement of employment as well as periodic training for employees
already working. Training of supervisors is particularly important given the
Supreme Court's clear mandate that employers may be held vicariously
liable for the conduct of supervisors. In order to ensure that the employer
derives maximum benefit from these efforts, records should be kept that
make clear who has received training and when.
Paul Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of Workplace
Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Under Title VII, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 55, 64 (1999). Louis DiLorenzo and Laura
Harshbarger have echoed these thoughts:
The recent rulings suggest that training rank and file employees in the use of
the complaint procedure may be as critical as training supervisors to refrain
from engaging in harassing conduct or to properly responding to complaints
or other notice of inappropriate conduct. As noted above, an employer
invoking the affirmative defense must be prepared to show that it acted
reasonably to prevent and correct harassment and that the plaintiff failed to
act reasonably to prevent, correct or otherwise avoid the harassing conduct.
An employer who demonstrates that all employees were made aware that
the employer had a policy and were also fully informed as to the procedure
for reporting harassment is far more likely to successfully demonstrate its
own reasonableness in preventing or correcting harassing behavior.
Moreover, an employer who actively trains all employees in the use of the
policy, and thereby educates its employees in the importance of their role in
preventing or correcting the prohibited behavior, will undoubtedly have a
273
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What if a company cannot afford formal training? Will there be an
undue-hardship exception to such a requirement for smaller or
fledgling employers? Finally, is the combination of implementing a
training program and maintaining and enforcing an adequate written
policy enough to satisfy the first prong? If not, what else must
employers do? Because of these numerous uncertainties, scholars
predicted that the question of the employers' reasonable care would
be sent to a jury, and accordingly, employers would not prevail on
summary judgment motions.
The second prong's requirements are similarly unclear. According
to many scholars, this prong's ambiguity benefits plaintiff-employees
opposing summary judgment motions. Two theories moor such a
prediction. First, some scholars assert that judges would frequently
leave to a jury the assessment of whether the plaintiff-employee acted
reasonably by failing to report the alleged harassment (generally, a
factual determination). 6 Second, other scholars argue that employees
not only can avoid summary judgment, but can also defeat the defense
and make the employer liable by reporting the alleged harassment."
Justice Thomas's dissent in Ellerth advances the latter proposition.
Justice Thomas reads the majority and concurring opinions as holding
that an employee who reports sexual harassment cannot, as a matter
of law, be found to have failed unreasonably to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
otherwise avoid harm.5 8  Thus, according to Justice Thomas, an
employer loses its affirmative defense to sexual harassment
allegations if and when the employee reports the harassment. 9
persuasive argument that an employee's failure to invoke the reporting
procedure was unreasonable, and, therefore, establish its affirmative burden.
DiLorenzo & Harshbarger, supra note 4, at 19-20.
55. See Beiner, supra note 19, at 74-75 (arguing that federal courts are misusing
summary judgment in hostile-environment cases brought under Title VII); Anne
Lawton, The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual
Harassment, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 75, 109 (1999) (indicating the possibility that
"lower federal courts will equate sexual harassment complaint procedures with
prevention programs," a consequence that would make it more difficult for employers
to win on summary judgment motions).
56. See Dominic Bencivenga, Looking for Guidance: High Court Rulings Leave
Key Terms Undefined, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1998, at 5 (discussing how practicing
attorneys think that the affirmative defense is not clear enough because the language
is ambiguous and the case law provides little guidance).
57. See Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual
Harassment, 17 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 813, 846 (1999) (noting that defendants should
rarely prevail in summary judgment motions in sexual harassment cases).
58. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766-67 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
59. See id. at 766-67, 773; Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 54, at 64-65 (arguing
that summary judgment decisions in favor of employers may decrease); see also
Francis Achampong, Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
by a Supervisor: A Critical Assessment of The Supreme Court's New Vicarious
Liability Standard, 28 Sw. U. L. Rev. 45, 66-67 (1998).
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Professor George, on the other hand, disputes this analysis and
instead argues that an employee's Title VII claim will fail if the
employer deals promptly and effectively with a victim's complaint. ' ,
The arguments advanced in the current literature reflect legitimate
hypotheses about a situation in which, at the time academics advanced
the arguments, little germane data existed. In the first eighteen
months that the new standard was in effect, however, courts decided
seventy-two cases in which employers moved for summary judgment
based on the affirmative defense. A comparison of the results of these
cases with the predictions discussed above reveals that some
hypotheses were correct, some were wrong, and that overall they
foreshadowed a rift in judicial treatment of the affirmative defense.
III. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND MODEL
Summary judgment permits courts to grant judgments as a matter
of law to a party who can establish that its opponent cannot prevail at
trial.6' When it weighs an employer's motion for summary judgment,
a court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the
employee, the non-moving party.62 Thus, by their very nature, courts'
analyses of employers' motions for summary judgment tilt heavily in
favor of the employee.'- Our data includes all published judicial
opinions (N=72) for cases involving alleged sexual harassment in the
workplace between June of 1998 and January of 2000 in which an
employer asserted an affirmative defense and advanced a motion for
summary judgment. Because our study uses the entire universe of
known cases, our sample is not exposed to questions concerning
selection bias.'
Although any study's reliance on published legal opinions
contained in the LEXIS and WestLaw databases imposes some
limitations, we nonetheless drew from these two conventional sources
of judicial opinions for our case dataset. Also, judicial opinion
content-analysis necessarily relies upon published opinions-which
account for an incomplete slice of our judicial system-that may or
may not represent or closely resemble the entire legal universe.
Employment discrimination cases illustrate this point. According to a
recent survey by the Administrative Office of the United States
60. See George, supra note 4, at 21.
61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986) (noting that courts must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party).
62. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
63. For a fuller discussion of the application of summary judgments in the hostile
workplace-environment cases, see Beiner, supra note 19, at 86-97.
64. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1377, 1409 n.147 (1998); see also Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin,
Statistics for Lawyers 262 (1990).
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Courts, ninety percent of employment discrimination cases do not go
to a trial on the merits.65 Because courts do not publish all of their
judicial opinions, a further filter is placed on those cases that result in
bench or jury verdicts.' Finally, even within the universe of published
opinions, not all are "officially" published, and therefore some are not
found in familiar legal reporter series.67
Our content analysis of each opinion helped generate our variables
and data. Numerous factors complicate content-analysis.
Regrettably, not all legal opinions are well or clearly written. In
addition, changes in statutory interpretation frequently are
unannounced or hidden. Although, on occasion, courts expressly
articulate a new interpretation, more frequently courts characterize
such changes "simply as the application of existing precedent to
slightly different factual circumstances." 61
Mindful of these difficulties, at least two individuals independently
read and coded each opinion in our study. To ensure that our opinion
content-analysis was as objective as possible, we constructed a review
mechanism involving a third colleague. As it turned out, we had few
coding disagreements and we resolved each without difficulty.
A. Variables
Table 1 provides a brief description of the variables included in our
study and Table 2 presents a statistical summary of these variables,
including their means and standard deviations.
1. Dependent Variables
Our study considers how employers' affirmative defenses fared at
the summary judgment level. Of particular interest is how courts
construe the two principal reasonableness requirements embedded
within the affirmative defense. To this end, the three dependent
variables in our study seek to isolate both prongs of the affirmative
defense, as well as the final result for each case. Thus, SATISFY_1 is
coded to identify when a court concluded that the employer met the
65. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report of the Director-1995, at 163
(1995) (noted in Beiner, supra note 19, at 120 n.330).
66. We use the term "judicial opinion" loosely in this context. Courts generate a
variety of official work products (e.g., judicial orders, memoranda, judgments and
opinions).
67. Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the
Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-At-
Will, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 999, 1038 n.152 (1995); see also William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States
Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573, 574 (1981) (noting a
decline in the rate of published appellate court opinions).
68. Morriss, supra note 67, at 1002 (discussing the evolution of common law).
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first prong of the affirmative defense. Similarly, SATISFY_2 is coded
to identify employers that satisfied the second prong.
Whether an employer's summary judgment motion prevailed
pivoted on that court's analysis of "reasonableness" within the specific
context of the affirmative defense. To advance a successful
affirmative defense in the sexual harassment context, an employer
must satisfy both prongs of the affirmative defense. More concretely,
the employer must establish that it acted reasonably to satisfy the first
prong and that the employee acted unreasonably with respect to the
second.69 Our third dependant variable, HOLDING, is coded to mark
cases where courts concluded that the employer satisfied both prongs
of the affirmative defense and granted the employer's motion for
summary judgment.
2. Independent Variables
To explore how courts construe reasonableness in the affirmative
defense setting, we examine two broad clusters of independent
variables. One cluster focuses on the employer, and the other on the
employee. Comparisons between the two variable clusters inform
how courts construe reasonableness within the larger context of
workplace sexual harassment. Moreover, such comparisons permit
crude conclusions about whether courts construe reasonableness in
terms of how employers or employees (or both) act.
Within the employer context we model satisfaction of the two-
prong affirmative defense along two broad axes. One axis relates to
whether an employer had a workplace harassment policy in place at
the time of the alleged incident and, if so, how the employer
structured, disseminated, and administered its policy. A second axis
focuses on whether the employer responded appropriately once it
became aware of a possible incident."
3. Employer Policy
POLICY is coded to identify those employers that had articulated a
formal sexual harassment policy. For those employers who had a
workplace harassment policy DISMPOL is coded to signal whether
the employer's policy was disseminated to employees. The judicial
opinions reveal that employers used various dissemination techniques
69. As discussed above, the affirmative defense includes two elements: the
employer must prove that it used reasonable care to prevent and correct the sexual
harassment, and that the employee "unreasonably failed" to utilize any of the
opportunities that the employer provided for employees to avoid harm. Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775,807 (1998).
70. Employers could become aware of a potentially actionable incident either
through a victim report or through other sources.
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that ranged from publishing and circulating an employee handbook to
having employees sign an acknowledgement form attesting that the
employee read and understood the workplace harassment policy. In
many employer harassment policies, an employee's supervisor is
frequently designated as the proper recipient of sexual harassment
complaints. Obvious structural and practical problems arise in those
instances where the supervisor is also the harasser. ALT._CHAN is
coded to identify those employers that designate someone other than
the employee's supervisor as the designated recipient of harassment
complaints. GOODPOL is a hybrid variable constructed to identify
when an employer's overall posture with respect to sexual harassment
is at its strongest. Specifically, GOODPOL is coded to signal when
an employer: (1) has articulated a policy; (2) disseminated it; (3)
made alternative reporting mechanisms available to its employees;
and (4) does not have any defects in its workplace sexual harassment
policy or practice.
4. Employer Response
The second axis along which decisions about the reasonableness of
employer action are plotted involves how employers respond to a
sexual harassment allegation once they become aware of it. Of
particular import is how the courts themselves characterize an
employer's response. GOOD_RSP signals when a court deemed an
employer to have responded properly to an allegation. Typically,
courts characterize responses as "good" when the employer
discharged a harassing employee even before a victim officially
reported the conduct. OTH_EFOR is coded to identify employers
that took steps beyond policy development, dissemination, and the
establishment of an alternative reporting channel to protect workers
from sexual harassment. Examples of such additional steps include
the establishment of a sexual harassment reporting "hot-line"', and
workplace training.
Just as positive employer actions can support efforts to establish
that an employer satisfied both prongs of the affirmative defense,
negative actions can support adverse judicial conclusions.
OTH_DFCT is coded to signal employers who exhibited defects in
their policies or practices independent of a failure to prevent alleged
harassing activity in the workplace. In general, courts appear to look
for evidence that the employer simply was not serious about handling
or responding to an allegation of sexual harassment. For example,
courts typically construed as defective those employers that were
aware of harassment, yet did little or nothing to rectify the situation.
71. "Hot-line" refers to a toll-free number that employees can use to report
harassment.
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5. Employee Action
Our second cluster of independent variables focuses on the
employee. EEFAIL identifies when the charging employee failed to
report the alleged harassment to the employer. Among those
employees who reported to employers, TIMERPT is coded to signal
those employees who did so in a timely manner, as determined by the
court. Finally, NATRRPT is coded to indicate when an employee's
report of workplace harassment was complete.
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF STANDARD VARIABLES
Variable Definition
Dependent
SATISFY_1 Employer satisfied first prong (I=yes)
SATISFY_2 Employer satisfied second prong (I =yes)
HOLDING Court granted summary judgment motion
(1=yes)
Employer
POLICY Employer had a policy (I =yes)
DISMPOL Employer disseminated policy (1--yes)
ALTCHAN Employer offered other ways to report (l=ycs)
GOODPOL Employer had a good policy (1=yes)
GOODRSP Employer had a good response (l=yes)
OTHEFOR Employer exerted additional effort (I =yes)
OTH_DFCT Employer had other related defects (I =yes)
Employee
EE_FAIL Employee failed to report (l=yes)
TIME_RPT Employee reported in a timely manner (l=yes)
NATRRPT Employee provided a full report (l=yes)
Although dummy variables72 possess certain shortcomings" their
benefits include relatively straightforward interpretability and an
ability to capture the potential influence of qualitative data. Table 2
presents summary information on the dependent and independent
variables included in our study. Notwithstanding the procedural
72. A dummy variable is binary coding that can be viewed as an electrical switch:
a code of "1" signals that a given characteristic is "present" or "on" for a particular
case. Conversely, a code of "0" signals that the characteristic is not present.
73. Although dummy variables are quite helpful in signaling when a particular
attribute is present, the variables' dichotomous nature (0,I) makes examination of any
possible underlying variation more difficult. For a thorough discussion, see Melissa A.
Hardy, Regression with Dummy Variables (1993).
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roadblocks discussed above which are designed to work against
parties seeking to prevail on a summary judgment motion, employers'
motions in our dataset succeeded in over one-half of the cases.
Employers met the first prong of the affirmative defense in almost
60% of the cases. However, a comparison of the means for the
HOLDING and SATISFY_1 variables reveals that in a few cases,
employers satisfied the first but not the second prong of the
affirmative defense, thereby resulting in the court denying the
employer's motion for summary judgment.74
More than 90% of the employers had articulated a workplace
harassment policy, but fewer than 70% of those employers
disseminated their policies to the employees. Moreover, 40%
provided an alternative channel for employees to report workplace
harassment. Finally, 38% of employers possessed the strongest
possible combination of positive attributes relating to workplace
sexual harassment policies.
B. Summary of Standard Variables
1. Employers
Of those employers that responded to employee reports of
harassment, only forty-four did so in a manner that courts
characterized as "good." To earn judicial approval of their response
to harassment complaints, employers typically had to take proactive
steps to address a harassment problem. One-quarter of the employers
took steps beyond disseminating a harassment policy. Finally, 11% of
employers were defective in other related ways that exacerbated the
alleged workplace harassment problem. Frequently, such employers
failed to respond to harassment complaints despite their knowledge of
a potential (or actual) problem.
2. Employees
Among the employees that sued their employers for liability for
workplace harassment, 42% did not report the harassment to their
employers. Fifteen percent of employees that alleged suffering from
sexual harassment in the workplace reported it to their employers in a
timely manner, and 39% provided a full report.
74. There are four such cases. See Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir.
1999); Moore v. Sam's Club, 55 F. Supp. 2d 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); DeWitt v.
Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Corcoran v. Shoney's Colonial Inc.,
24 F. Supp. 2d 601 (W.D. Va. 1998).
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TABLE 2:


















Note: Dataset includes 72 cases.
C. Methodology
Our study uses qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The
qualitative component involves content analysis of the entire set of
judicial opinions. We are thus informed not only by the judicial
outcome, but also by the rich information contained in the judicial
opinions themselves. The judicial opinions provide invaluable clues
about the courts' struggle with implementing the newly articulated
affirmative defense, particularly about the difficulty in applying the
reasonableness standard. This qualitative aspect supplements and,
indeed, complements our quantitative component."
The quantitative component of our study uses both descriptive and
inferential statistical techniques. Not only do we believe that multiple
methodologies deepen our understanding, but our sample size (N=72)
guides our decision to use multiple methodologies. Our sample size is
at once large enough to permit cautious use of multivariate
techniques, such as multiple regression, yet small enough to permit
content analysis of the entire dataset.76 By analyzing our data using
75. For more on the benefits of using multiple methodologies in studying legal
opinions, see Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 64, at 1410-12.
76. For a discussion of sample size in logit models, see Alfred DeMaris, Logit
Modeling: Practical Applications 41 (1992).
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both types of methodologies, we feel more confident with our
understanding of the overall picture that emerges.
D. Model
We model whether employers successfully satisfy both prongs of the
affirmative defense, as well as the overall judicial holding, as a
function of six employer and employee variables. Because we analyze
the influence of numerous variables, a multiple regression model was
necessary. Multiple regression analyses permit examination of the
relation between independent variables and a dependant variable
(here, case outcomes relating to the holding and prongs one and two
of the affirmative defense) while controlling for all six independent
variables entered into the equation. Consequently, we can look to see
what independent influence, if any, is exerted by the employer and
employee variable clusters on the courts' analyses. Within the array
of appropriate regression models, we settled on logistic regression
principally because the dependant variables examined are
dichotomous. 7
The nature of the employer's workplace harassment policy, the
employer's response to the incident, and other related defects make
up the employer variable cluster. Whether the employee reported the
alleged harassment, and such a report's timeliness and completeness,
constitute the employee variable cluster.
Along with our statistical model, we generated a standard set of
independent variables. In addition to the issues previously discussed,
multicollinearity issues informed the composition of our standard
77. Our selection of logistic regression warrants some discussion. Our decision
flows principally from the dichotomous nature of all three dependent variables-
SATISF A, SATISFB, and HOLDING-considered in our analyses. As
dichotomous variables, they are coded "1" if the relevant condition is present and "0"
if not. As a result, the usual linear regression models, such as Ordinary Least Squares
("OLS"), are not appropriate. OLS models, for example, allow the predicted values
to fall outside the 0 to 1 range of our dependent variables. Moreover, OLS is
relatively less efficient because the error cannot be normally distributed and it cannot
have constant variance. For a fuller discussion of these points, see Finkelstein &
Levin, supra note 64, at 447-52; and John Fox, Applied Regression Analysis, Linear
Models, and Related Methods 442 (1997).
In logistic regression, the dependent variable is the natural log of the odds ratio of
the probability that an event occurs to the probability that it does not occur
[L=log[p/(1-p)]]. For more on logistic regression models, see generally John H.
Aldrich & Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Modeling:
Practical Applications (1984) (deriving equations for logit and probit models); Alfred
DeMaris, Logit Modeling: Practical Applications (1992) (describing use and
application of logit models); and Eric A. Hanushek & John E. Jackson, Statistical
Methods for Social Scientists 179-216 (1977) (explaining discrete variable problems
and deriving logit and probit models).
Thus, with logistic regression models, we can assess the independent influence-if
any-exerted by our two clusters of six independent variables on each of the three
dependent dummy variables.
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variable set. We could not, of course, include in a single regression
equation independent variables that were highly collinear. Where two
(or more) independent variables in a regression equation are highly
collinear, the resulting regression coefficients remain unbiased but
become increasingly inefficient.78  We adopted a conservative
approach to this problem. 9 Notably, for each dependent variable we
run three separate versions, each with one variable from the employee
cluster. Multicollinearity concerns also led us to exclude a single
variable, OTHEFOR, from our standard model.
IV. RESULTS
A. First Prong
To satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense, an employer
must establish that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior.' As we previously
discussed, what constitutes "reasonable care" is far from clear. We
hypothesize that whether employers meet the first prong of the
affirmative defense is largely a function of the employer's conduct
rather than that of the employee. An employer's conduct involves
two general factors: one relating to the employer's policy, and the
other to the employer's response to the sexual harassment allegation.
Results for SATISFY_1,8 1 presented in Table 3A, offer general
support for our hypothesis. That is, the only variable that achieves
statistical significance is GOODPOL. All employer-related
coefficients point in the expected direction. For example, the positive
coefficients for GOODPOL indicate that employers that benefited
78. For a fuller explanation, see William D. Berry and Stanley Feldman, Multiple
Regression in Practice 44-45 (1985).
79. No firm rule exists within the literature for guarding against multicollinearity.
See, e.g., George W. Bohrnstedt & David Knoke, Statistics for Social Data Analysis
407 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting exclusion of variables where coefficients exceed .5);
Finkelstein & Levin, supra note 64, at 532 ("A simple (but not foolproof) test for
multicollinearity involves looking for high correlations (e.g., in excess of .9) in pairs of
variables .... "); Michael Lewis-Beck, Applied Regression: An Introduction 60 (1980)
("For diagnosis, we must look directly at the intercorrelation of the independent
variables. A frequent practice is to examine the bivariate correlations among the
independent variables, looking for coefficients of about .8, or larger."). We adopted a
two-fold approach to guard against multicollinearity. First, we generated a bivariate
correlation matrix for all independent variables included in our model. In every
instance, we adopted the more conservative approach. Thus, where two independent
variables' coefficients exceeded .5, we excluded one of the related variables from our
model.
80. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
81. The N for SATISFYI, fifty, is one less than the total number of cases in our
dataset. In one case a court reached its conclusion without expressly addressing
whether the employer satisfied the first prong of the affirmative defense.
82. This is true for analyses on two of the three depeidant variables.
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from a good policy were more likely to satisfy prong one. Conversely,
the negative coefficients for OTHDFCT suggest that employers that
were defective in some manner that bore on a sexual harassment
allegation were less likely to satisfy prong one.
Results for the employee-related independent variable sharply
contrast, thereby providing further support for the argument that, in
construing the first prong of the affirmative defense, courts are most
concerned with employer, rather than employee, conduct. All three
employee-cluster coefficients point in the expected direction-
negative. Notably, not one employee-related variable correlates at a
statistically significant level with SATISFY_1. Although
exceptionally little-if anything-properly can be inferred from the
absence of statistical significance, the juxtaposition of the results for
the employer and employee clusters of independent variables
supports the general point that whether an employer successfully
satisfies the first prong of the affirmative defense is largely dependent
on the employer's conduct, not the employee's.
TABLE3A




GOODPOL 3.60** 3.33** 11.83
(1.20) (1.20) (75.41)
12.42 18.98 32.26
GOODRESP (63.88) (81.04) (165.76)









Constant -1.49** -1.25* -1.10
(.56) (.57) (.58)
% predicted 92.96 92.65 94.12
McFadden's
psuedo R2 .72 .72 .80
(N) 71 68 68




To satisfy the second prong of the affirmative defense, an employer
must demonstrate that the employee unreasonably failed to avail
himself or herself of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer to avoid harm." In contrast to the first
prong, judicial determinations about what constitutes
"reasonableness" within the context of the second prong should
involve employee-related factors. That is, an employee's conduct
should influence a court's analysis of whether an employee acted
reasonably in this aspect of the affirmative defense.
However, we also predict that employer-related variables will
remain relevant and correlative with the dependant variable. One
explanation for our counter-intuitive hypothesis pivots on the
placement of the affirmative defense's burden on the employer, as
well as the standard of review for summary judgment motions. Where
employers assert an affirmative defense and seek a favorable
summary judgment, courts appear to allow employers either to make
or break their own cases. Another explanation is that courts might
conflate employer and employee conduct in their analyses of whether
employees acted reasonably. Specifically, employer conduct might
partly inform courts' characterizations of whether an employee acted
unreasonably. That is to say, whether an employer consistently had
failed to address past harassment might, for example, influence how
courts characterize an employee's incomplete report. If so, the
confusion flowing from such a conflation of employer and employee
conduct would manifest itself in the courts' treatment of the second
prong.
Results for SATISFY_2,' presented in Table 3B, provide support
for the first part of our two-part hypothesis on employee-related
variables, but not for the second. In contrast to our prediction, we
find that employee-related variables do not influence judicial
determinations of whether complaining employees acted reasonably.
Indeed, although all the employee variables point in the expected
direction-negative -none achieves statistical significance. So, if
courts do not look to employee activity when construing whether a
complaining employee acted reasonably, to what do they look?
As we predicted in the second part of our hypothesis, certain
employer-related behaviors emerge as significant. Indeed, the
persistent significance of employer-related variables underscores the
courts' orientation around employer actions, even when construing
employee reasonableness. Thus, an employer's good policy and, in
83. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
84. The N for SATISFY_2, forty-five, is less than that of the other two dependent
variables considered in this study. In six cases, the courts' opinions simply do not
address whether the employer satisfied the affirmative defense's second prong.
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two of three runs, good response to workplace sexual harassment
issues appear to influence a court's determination about whether an
employee acted reasonably, at least within the context of the
affirmative defense. Such factors as whether an employer has a good
sexual harassment policy and responds well to an allegation may
prove sufficient to satisfy prongs one and two, independent of what an
employee may or may not do.
The fact that employee-related conduct does not prevent employers
from prevailing does not mean that employee conduct has no effect on
the outcome of cases. While there is no employee action that
significantly affects an employee's ability to prevent summary
judgment, employees can almost guarantee a victory for the employer
if they fail to report. Employees failed to report harassment in
twenty-eight of the seventy-two cases studied. In twenty of those
cases the employer prevailed. This is not a striking number on its
face. Additional analysis, however, reveals a very telling result. In
the eight cases in which courts denied summary judgment despite the
fact that the employee failed to report, the employer did not satisfy
the first prong of the two-step test.' Alternatively, courts granted an
employer's motion for summary judgment in each of the twenty cases
in which employers satisfied the first prong and the employee failed to
report. Accordingly, in the first seventy-two reported cases,
employees who failed to report were deemed to have acted
unreasonably, and could not avoid summary judgment as long as their
employers satisfied the first prong.
85. See Sims v. Health Midwest Physician Servs. Corp., 196 F.3d 915 (8th Cir.
1999); Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.S.C. 1999); Meng v. Ipanema
Shoe Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Early v. Morris Newspaper Corp., 54
F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Matute v. Hyatt Corp., No. 98 CIV 1712, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2873 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1999); Vandermeer v. Douglas County, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 970 (D. Nev. 1998); Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 9 F. Supp. 2d 955
(N.D. 111. 1998); Dull v. St. Luke's Hospital of Duluth, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Minn.
1998).
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TABLE 38




GOODPOL 2.97** 2.77** 2.9766
(.92) (.98) (.97)
2.75** 11.06 3.Voa
GOODRESP (_83) (41.46) (124)







NATRRPT - - -2.30
(1.21)
Constant -1.53* -1.29" -1.11
(_56) (.58) (.58)
% predicted 89.06 90.48 90.48
McFadden's
psuedo R2 .49 .65 .54
(N) 64 63 63
* p <.05; ** p <.01.
C. Holding
Employers that satisfied the requirements of both prongs of the
affirmative defense and established that they were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law succeeded in their summary judgment
motions. As such, what we expect to find for HOLDING builds on
what we found for SATISFY_1 and SATISFY_2. Tables 3A and 3B
illustrate the importance of employer conduct and the comparative
lack of importance of employee conduct. Because the satisfaction of
prongs one and two drives a court's conclusion about whether an
employer's motion for summary judgment should succeed, then
logically it should follow that only employer-related variables should
correlate with HOLDING.
The results for HOLDING, presented in Table 3C, confirm our
expectation. Similar to our results for prong two, none of the
employee-related variables achieve statistical significance. The same
two employer-related variables-GOODPOL and GOODRESP-
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emerge as important. Also similar to the earlier tables, all coefficients
in Table 3C point in the expected directions.
TABLE 3c




GOOD_POL 3.04** 2.71** 3.03**
(.92) (.95) (.97)
2.93** 11.10 4.06**
GOODRESP (.82) (40.08) (1.25)









Constant -1.62** -1.37* -1.26*
(.55) (.56) (.57)
% predicted 90.28 89.86 91.30
McFadden's
psuedo R2 .54 .64 .57
(N) 72 69 69
*p <.05; ** p <.01.
V. CONTENT ANALYSIS: WHAT THE LAW IS
AND WHAT IT SHOULD BE
Results from the quantitative analyses of summary judgment
motions yield several surprises. First, in contrast to numerous
commentators' predictions,86 employers won in a majority of the cases.
The source of both the inaccurate predictions and the unanticipated
results revolves around three different hypotheses that commentators
86. See George, supra note 4, at 17-18 (predicting difficulty for employers that
attempt to establish the affirmative defense when plaintiffs can posit facts alleging
fear of retaliation as an underlying justification for failing to promptly report the
harassing behavior); Jonathan W. Dion, Note, Putting Employers on the Defense: The
Supreme Court Develops a Consistent Standard Regarding an Employer's Liability for
a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev.
199, 221-22 (1999).
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believed would prevent courts from finding, as a matter of law, in
favor of employers. These hypotheses are: (1) "reasonable care"
requires more than maintenance and enforcement of a policy against
sexual harassment, and courts will let juries determine if employers
meet the standard; (2) the question of whether employees acted
unreasonably because they failed to report alleged harassment will be
sent to juries; and (3) employees who report harassment can never be
considered unreasonable as a matter of law, and thus when plaintiff-
employees do report the alleged harassment, employers cannot
prevailY
In fact, our analyses reveal that courts are prepared to conclude
that a good policy constitutes "reasonable care," and that employers
can prevail regardless of whether plaintiffs reported harassment.'
Our next step is to assess whether our empirical findings comport with
results from our qualitative content analysis of the published judicial
opinions.
A. What Is Reasonable Care?
Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, courts generally did not impose
vicarious liability on employers that did not know or could not have
known that a supervisor created a hostile environment. That is, courts
generally imposed a negligence standard upon employers.l To meet
the "reasonable care" requirement, employers typically distributed
written harassment policies and were confident that this immunized
them from liability unless the employee reported the harassment and
the employer subsequently failed to address the conduct. Following
the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, however, a quick consensus
emerged among employers, their consultants, and attorneys that the
earlier "reasonableness" requirement had changed, and that the mere
creation and dissemination of policies would not sufficeY' One
perception was that employers would need to police the work
environment more thoroughly by providing training and ongoing
sensitivity workshops.91 However, our analyses of the post-Ellerth and
Faragher cases do not support the argument that the duty owed by the
employer had changed in any material manner.
87. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 773 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Bencivenga,
supra note 56.
8& See infra notes 134-35, 146, 148 and accompanying text.
89. See, eg., Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997);
Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993); Burns v. McGregor
Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552,
558 (4th Cir. 1987).
90. Numerous management-side law firms and human resource consulting firms
began aggressively marketing sexual harassment training. See also supra note 4.




As explained previously, the overwhelming majority of cases holds
that an employer exercises reasonable care when it has a policy that is
disseminated to all employees, and it provides employees with an
opportunity to report the harassment to someone other than a
harassing supervisor.' In fact, we found only one case holding that
"reasonable care" requires more than such a policy.93 Thus, at this
time, the law is relatively clear: a so-called "good policy" constitutes
"reasonable care."
B. Employees Who Do Not Report
Many of the commentators who addressed the impact of employees'
failure to report argued that employers would not prevail on the
affirmative defense in such situations because courts would allow
juries to determine whether it is reasonable for employees to fail to
report sexual harassment.94 Michael Harper sets forth a rationale to
support this prediction in Employer Liability for Harassment Under
Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth. 95 Harper
argues that employees who fail to report harassment should be
deemed "unreasonable" only if their employers prove that they
provided adequate assurances against retaliation.96  Absent such
proof, Harper contends, employers should not be able to prevail on
the affirmative defense even when their employees fail to report.
97
In contrast to the predictions and the policy arguments, courts
found employees to be unreasonable in any instance where the
employer satisfied the first prong and the employees failed to report
harassment.98 Based on this fact, it seems that failure to report is
tantamount to per se "unreasonable" behavior. There is some legal
support for such an inference. For example, the court in Kohler v.
Inter-Tel Technologies9 9 held that an employee who failed to report
had acted unreasonably, but did not explain why this was so.100
Contrary legal authority exists also, however. Other decisions finding
a failure to report to be unreasonable support the proposition that
facts could arise which would send such a question to a jury.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
93. Lancaster v. Sheffler Enters., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
94. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 55; Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 57.
95. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII. A
Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 41 (1999).
96. Id. at 77-78.
97. Id. at 48. It should be noted that Harper does not predict what courts would
do. Instead, Harper focuses on what courts should do. This distinction is important
because Harper never predicts that courts will, in fact, follow his prescriptions.
98. That is, in twenty cases out of twenty.
99. No. C98-0378 MJJ, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5425 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1999).
100. The court explained that "plaintiff acted unreasonably by never reporting any
harassment and choosing not to cooperate in Inter-Tel's investigation." Id. at *15.
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In Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc.,1 the plaintiff argued that she did not
complain about being harassed because "she didn't feel comfortable
enough with anyone at AutoZone to speak with them about the ...
conduct.""° In finding such fear to be unreasonable the court stated:
"we conclude that an employee's subjective fears of confrontation,
unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duty
under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile
environment."1 3  One can infer from the court's holding that if
subjective evidence is insufficient to justify a failure to report, then
objective evidence would, in fact, create a jury question.
Such an inference is made stronger by the Kibby v. Chief Auto Parts
Inc. decision.)° The court in Kibby found the employees' actions to
be unreasonable because the plaintiffs failed to "[identify] any
material fact issue regarding their failure to use the process set up by
Chief to protect them from sexual harassment or to show lack of
reasonable care."105 Again, this case implies that certain material facts
could potentially justify a plaintiff's failure to report. This is
important because it is likely that plaintiffs' lawyers, relying on the
early predictions spurred by the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, as
well as on the general rule that questions of reasonableness go to
juries, did not create a record of the type of factual disputes that
would satisfy the courts. Now, plaintiffs' lawyers will know that in
order to reach a jury, a plaintiff must provide objective evidence to
prove that he or she was reasonable in not reporting. This conclusion
is further supported by the court in Vandermeer v. Douglas County,"
which stated that:
[D]efendants will have to show that the plaintiffs unreasonably
failed to report [the harasser's] behavior pursuant to the sexual
harassment policy, and not merely that they failed to report it....
Since the plaintiffs have argued that they had legitimate reasons for
not reporting [the harasser's] behavior.., it will be up to the trier of
fact to determine whether or not the plaintiffs did act reasonably. l
101. 180 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 1999).
102 Id. at 813.
103. Id.
104. No. 3:97-CV-2180-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2894 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 1999).
105. Id. at *20.
106. 15 F. Supp. 2d 970,981 (D. Nev. 1998).
107. Id In addition to holding that the reasonableness of the employee was a jury
question, the court also denied the employer's motion for summary judgment
because: (1) the employee claimed that the employer knew of the harassment so there
was no need to report; and (2) the employer failed to satisfy the first element of the




C. Employees Who Do Report
It is clear-and arguably understandable-that a plaintiff-
employee's failure to report alleged harassment may have extremely
adverse repercussions for the plaintiffs case. The result when a
plaintiff-employee does lodge an appropriate complaint is less clear.
Justice Thomas argued in his Ellerth dissent that an employer cannot
possibly prevail on a summary judgment motion in a case in which the
employee reported the alleged harassment.08 Thomas predicates this
argument on the theory that, as a matter of law, an employee cannot
unreasonably fail to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer when that employee did in
fact make the employer aware of the alleged harassment."m
Some courts have agreed with Justice Thomas by mechanically
applying the defense. These courts deny summary judgment to
defendant-employers even when the employers did all that they could
have done to prevent and correct harassment. For example, in Moore
v. Sam's Club,"' the plaintiff alleged that the co-manager of the store
harassed and then raped her."' The conduct occurred either in late
March or early April."2 The plaintiff complained on April 25."1 On
May 1, the employer asked the plaintiff to provide a detailed
statement."4  The company then investigated and suspended the
harasser on May 3.115 The suspension ended on June 15, and the
company then demoted and transferred the harasser.1 6 The plaintiff
then requested a transfer from New York to Florida, and the company
consented.17 The plaintiff moved to Florida but did not report to
work, choosing instead to sue. 8
In addressing the summary judgment motion, the court first held
that Sam's Club had exercised reasonable care both in formulating its
policy and in responding to the complaint." 9 The court then held,
however, that Sam's Club could not prevail on the second prong of the
defense because the plaintiff took full advantage of the preventative
measures provided, and therefore had not acted unreasonably.120
108. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 773 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
109. Id.
110. 55 F. Supp. 2d 177 (1999).
111. Id. at 180-85.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 179.
114. Id. at 180.
115. Id. at 182.
116. Id. at 192.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 191.
120. The court noted that the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense "does
not apply here." Id. at 192. The court also noted that "[it is thus unclear how the
[Ellerth]lFaragher defense, on its own terms, would apply here" because the factual
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Thus, Sam's Club did everything it could have, but lost because the
plaintiff also had acted appropriately.121
To some, perhaps, this case's outcome is just. The employee
suffered a horrible experience, and the company compensated her for
it. It is problematic, however, when a court bases an employer's
liability on the employee's actions, and not on the actions of the
company. This problem can lead to inconsistent and sometimes
inexplicable results that create an incentive for employers to refrain
from doing all they can to prevent and correct harassment. A
hypothetical scenario illustrates this problem.
Assume that there are two chain restaurants located across the
street from each other, Company A and Company B. Both companies
have well-drafted policies against sexual harassment. Both
restaurants distribute the policies to all employees, and both require
that all employees sign forms that acknowledge their receipt and
comprehension of the policies' contents. In addition, Company B has
a "1-800" number for employees to report harassment twenty-four
hours-a-day. Company A has no such hotline. The night-managers of
the stores are best friends who share the odious belief that one of their
jobs' "benefits" includes the license to sexually harass their respective
employees. Despite corporate policy strictly and clearly prohibiting
such behavior, each manager sexually harasses one employee for one
month. Both employees are equally upset by the harassment, but fear
reporting it. The employee from Company A sees no way to address
the problem, so she quits. The employee from Company B also
contemplates quitting. She then realizes, however, that there is
another option: Company B employee calls the "1-800" number and
files a complaint. The company representative who receives the call
promises to investigate. Company B conducts a thorough
investigation and fires the manager. Two months later, the Company
B employee quits. The two employees each subsequently file lawsuits.
Under the vast majority of lower courts' interpretation of Ellerth and
Faragher, Company A would be able to satisfy the new affirmative
defense because the employee never complained. It would escape
liability entirely. Under the Moore court's interpretation, however,
Company B would be liable.1"
One conclusion from this scenario is clear: employers should
exercise reasonable care by instituting a policy, and then hope that no
scenario of those cases are distinct from those in Moore. Id. at 193.
121. The Court may have been penalizing Sam's Club because of the relatively
minor punishment that the company meted out on a supervisor who raped an
employee. If so, the case is even more problematic because other courts could follow
the stated rationale-that employers cannot prevail when the employee reports-
even when the employer provided the utmost care and gave out appropriate
discipline.
122. The employer would not be able to assert the affirmative defense, and would
therefore be liable, because there would be clear evidence of sexual harassment.
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one uses it. Moreover, employers attempting to limit their liability
should exercise reasonable care, but not too much care because
employers can be punished when employees feel comfortable enough
to use the procedures."2 Thus, employers should not provide "1-800"
numbers to give their employees an impersonal, twenty-four hours-a-
day avenue for reporting supervisor misconduct because such
employers are worse off than those who provide a more restrictive-
yet reasonable-means for reporting harassment. Under this
interpretation of the law, extra effort by the employers to prevent
harassment (such as elaborate and expensive so-called "sexual-
harassment training" for employees) might work against companies
under the affirmative defense because employees at those companies
may have a greater propensity to report, which will preclude the
employer from satisfying the defense. Unfortunately, a standard that
provides an incentive for employers to devise a subtle system that
satisfies the courts but discourages complaints, does not, we believe,
effectively lead to the ultimate goal of eliminating sexual harassment
in the workplace.
Most courts that have interpreted the affirmative defense have
refused to hold employers who responded properly to complaints of
sexual harassment liable for the actions of their supervisors. Instead,
most courts wish to reward employers for doing what they should to
prevent and correct harassment, and do not want their holdings to be
based solely on whether the employer fortuitously employed someone
who failed to act reasonably by not reporting. Thus, judges are
drafting result-oriented opinions in which they must comport their
conclusions, which are based exclusively on the employer's actions
(i.e., prevention and response to harassment), with the language of
Ellerih and Faragher. The majority of courts does just that, and
justifies this seemingly anomalous result in one of two ways.
First, several courts created what arguably amounts to new
legislation. In Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.,24 the Fifth Circuit
distinguished Ellerth and Faragher from cases in which an employee
123. One's judgment of this result depends on his or her perspective as to what
constitutes the best outcome of a sexual harassment case. If one believes that the best
result is that a plaintiff who is harassed receives compensation, then Moore's result is
appealing. Reporting harassment is simply a procedural hoop (like filing with the
EEOC) that guarantees a damage award for those who have been subjected to such
treatment.
Alternatively, if one believes that the best result is to eliminate the harassment, to
punish the harasser, and to let the plaintiff keep her job and receive damages only if
the company fails to properly respond, then Moore's result is problematic. If the
plaintiff in Moore had not reported the harassment, Wal-Mart would not have known
of the harassment, the harasser would not have been demoted, the plaintiff most
probably would not have been granted a transfer to the store of her choice, and Wal-
Mart would not have been found liable. Thus, not reporting, which is the only way for
employers to prevail, results in three objectively undesirable outcomes.
124. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
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utilized an employer's policies and procedures, and held that the
affirmative defense created by the Supreme Court does not apply in
such situations.125 The court then created what essentially amounts to
a new defense for employers: employers who swiftly respond to
complaints of sexual harassment are not liable for the actions of their
supervisors.1" Applying this standard, the court held:
[B]ecause she promptly complained of Arnaudet's harassing
conduct, and because the company promptly responded, disciplined
Arnaudet appropriately and stopped the harassment, the district
court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to Freeman.
Even if a hostile work environment claim had been stated, which is
dubious, Freeman's prompt remedial response relieves it of Title
VII vicarious liability.1
27
Despite what seems to be a rejection of Ellerth and Faragher, the
Indest court stated that it relied on the principles of these two cases
along with Meritor"8 to formulate its holding.- The court explained
that when a plaintiff promptly complains, both the employee and the
employer could thwart harassment before it becomes actionableY"
This result, according to the court, effectuates the purposes of Title
VII because the employee receives the benefit of having the
harassment stopped, and the employer is rewarded for its swift
response.13 1 Moreover, this standard comports with Meritor, which
held that an employer is not liable automatically for the actions of its
supervisors. 32
Indest supports what could be seen as a departure from Ellerth and
Faragher by arguing that a prompt report and timely response will
prevent the conduct from being severe or pervasive enough to be
actionable. This may be true, but it does not reflect the facts of this
case because the Indest court did not hold that the conduct was not
severe or pervasive. Instead, the court noted that it need not address
that issue because the company promptly responded to the
harassment complaint, and thus satisfied the affirmative defense. 33
Hence, in the Fifth Circuit, an employer who exercises reasonable
care in responding to a complaint of sexual harassment will be able to
125. Id at 265 (noting that "Ellerth and Faragher do not, however, directly speak to
the circumstances before us, a case in which the plaintiff quickly resorted to
Freeman's policy and grievance procedure against sexual harassment, and the
employer took prompt remedial action").
126. Id. at 266.
127. Id. at 267.
128. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
129. Indest, 164 F.3d at 266.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
133. Indest, 164 F.3d at 267.
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prevail on the affirmative defense and avoid liability even if the
conduct was severe or pervasive.
Indest was not the only case in our sample to depart somewhat from
the affirmative defense. Like the Indest court, the court in Whitaker v.
Mercer County134 was faced with a situation in which the employee
reported the harassment, and the employer responded appropriately.
As the court noted, there was "no dispute that [defendant] afforded
the plaintiff a complaint procedure through which to report [the
supervisor's] assault, nor is there any dispute that the plaintiff availed
herself of that procedure."'35 Instead of following Indest and expressly
stating that the affirmative defense does not apply in such situations,
the court simply ignored the defense and focused on a seemingly
ancillary issue. According to the court, the sole issue in that case was
"whether the County Defendants had any prior knowledge of [the
supervisor's] proclivity to commit the sexual assault, and if so,
whether they took reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff from
him."'36 The court then granted the defendant's motion based on
satisfaction of these criteria. 37
Evidently, the courts in Indest and Whitaker were loath to rule
against "good actor" employers, so they distinguished the cases from
Ellerth and Faragher. Like Indest and Whitaker, other courts have
delivered result-oriented opinions. In fact, at least one court may
have followed the Indest standard. In Hammonds v. Fitzgerald's
Mississippi, Inc.,38 the plaintiff alleged that she was subject to
unwanted sexual advances by her supervisor, but failed to report or
use any of the remedies provided by the defendant's sexual
harassment policy.'39 Nine months later, according to the plaintiff, the
same supervisor raped her. 4° She filed a report with the Human
Resources Department three weeks after the incident. 41 After the
plaintiff reported the rape, the defendant thoroughly investigated the
incident, and the harasser resigned under threat of termination.'42 In
granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, the court
referenced two different rationales that could form the basis for the
holding: (1) the employer's response and (2) the fact that the
employee did not report the conduct that preceded the rape. 4- The
court did not, however, state which rationale was dispositive. If it
relied on the employer's response, then the court applied the rationale
134. 65 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.N.J. 1999).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 246-47.
138. No. 2:98CV204-B, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19548 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 8, 1999).
139. Id. at *8-9.
140. Id. at *3.
141. Id. at *4.
142. Id. at *10.
143. See id.
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set forth in Indest. While this may be problematic to some, it is not
nearly as objectionable as relying on the employee's "late" or
defective report. Unfortunately, most courts presiding over cases in
which the employee reported harassment and the employer
responded properly have granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment by evaluating the plaintiff's report and concluding it to be
untimely or otherwise defective."
In twelve cases from our sample, courts found plaintiffs to have
acted unreasonably because they delayed reporting the harassment."*
In some cases, there was a delay of one year or more between the first
harassing action and the report.Y In other cases, however, the delay
was a matter of months or even weeks. For example, in Nuris Guerra
v. Editorial Televisa-USA, Inc.,147 the plaintiff, who began working on
May 28, 1996, was harassed every day from her first week of work
until she complained on June 20, 1996." In dismissing the case, the
court held that the delay, combined with the employer's prompt and
proper response, satisfied the second prong of the defense. 49
Similarly, in Mirakhorli v. DFW Management Co.,'-' it was unclear if
the harassment began either two or eight months before the plaintiff
complained.151  The court was unconcerned with the discrepancy
because it found a delay of either two or eight months to be
unreasonable as a matter of law.512 Finally, in Dedner v. Oklahoma,'"
the plaintiff waited three months to report the harassment because
she did not think the employer's procedures would be effective and
144. Reports are defective because they are either untimely or reported to the
wrong party. A defective report, according to numerous courts, indicates an
unreasonable employee response. See ii.fra notes 145, 146, and 149.
145. It must be noted that in each of these cases the employer responded with
reasonable care according to the court. See Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863
(9th Cir. 1999); Wright v. Anixter, Inc., No. 98-17164, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19962,
at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1999); Desmarteau v. Wichita, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079-80
(D. Kan. 1999); Mandy v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1111 (E.D. Wis.
1999); Guerra v. Editorial Televisa-USA, Inc., No. 97-3670-CIV-UNGARO-
BENAGES, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10082, at *32-33, *38 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 1999);
Mirakhorli v. DFW Mgmt. Co., No. 3:94-CV-1464-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344, at
*24 n.16, *25 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 1999); EEOC v. Barton Protective Servs., Inc., 47 F.
Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 1999); Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96 C 2021, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7219, at *16-18 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 1999); Dedner v. Oklahoma, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1254, 1259-60 (E.D. Okla. 1999); Madray v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1371, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 1998): Montero v. Agco Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143,
1146 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Marsicano v. Soc'y of Safety Eng'rs, No. 97C 7819, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14314, at *21-23 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3,1998).
146. See, e.g., Hetreed, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7219, at *3.
147. No. 97-3670-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10082 (S.D.
Fla. June 2,1999).
148. Id. at *5-6, *12.
149. Id at *32-38.
150. No. 3:94-CV-1464-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 1999).
151. Id. at *24 n.16.
152- Id.
153. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (E.D. Okla. 1999).
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because she thought the supervisor would stop the harassing
behavior.'-' Again, the court found the delay unreasonable and
granted summary judgment.'55
Delay is not the only rationale that courts use for finding that
employees who reported harassment nonetheless acted unreasonably.
Several decisions hold that reporting to the wrong party constitutes an
unreasonable failure to take advantage of the employer's policies and
procedures. In DeCesare v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,156 the
plaintiff complained by mentioning the sexual harassment to her
union representative instead of using the company's procedures. 5 7
The court found this to be unreasonable.15 s In Masson v. School
Board,'59 an employee filed multiple complaints to people who were
not designated to hear sexual harassment complaints.160  Moreover,
she complained of being replaced, not sexually harassed.' 6' The court
dismissed the case. 62 In Powell v. Morris,163 however, the court held
that a jury should decide whether a report that did not follow
procedures was unreasonable 64
Judging the reasonableness of a complainant's actions creates
numerous problems. In certain circumstances, it makes little sense to
hold that an employee's waiting several months to report harassment
is unreasonable. Pursuing a sexual harassment complaint can be
difficult. Regardless of the company's procedures, employees may
wonder if they are being overly sensitive by misinterpreting innocent
banter, or if they can resolve the issue without the angst and difficulty
associated with pursuing a formal complaint. As both the Indest
court' 65 and Professor Harper 166 point out, early complaints may pare
154. Id. at 1260.
155. Id. While a delay may be unreasonable as a matter of law to some courts,
others have denied summary judgment motions so that a jury could decide if the
plaintiffs' delays were reasonable. See Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 507-08 &
n.1, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that reasonableness of plaintiffs one-and-a-half month
delay was a question for the jury); Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d
870, 884 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (noting plaintiff's three month delay).
156. No. 98-3851, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7560 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1999).
157. Id. at *3.
158. The court noted that the "[p]laintiff acknowledge[d] that defendant issued a
paper to everybody regarding its sexual harassment policy," that plaintiff made no
attempt to look for any personnel manual or policies regarding sexual harassment,
and that she consciously opted not to look for any such policy because she preferred
to go through the union. Id. at *19. The court held as unreasonable this "failure to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer." Id. at *19-20. But see Watts, 170 F.3d at 510-11 (holding that the filing of a
grievance was reasonable as a matter of law).
159. 36 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
160. Id. at 1359.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1359-60.
163. 37 F. Supp. 2d. 1011 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
164. See id. at 1020.
165. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258,266 (5th Cir. 1999).
1298 [Vol. 69
2001] AFFLRMATIVEDEFENSE TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
the harassment before it blooms to an unlawful level; therefore such
early, non-litigation activity should be encouraged. Early reporting of
claims should not, however, be required in order to sustain a plaintiff's
case through a defendant's summary judgment motion. Employees
should not have to endure the stress of what results in, for all intents
and purposes, a two-month statute of limitations on harassment.
Moreover, such a short time frame will stimulate negative
workplace repercussions. Employers should take complaints seriously
and may need time to determine all relevant facts. A short "statute of
limitations" will force employees to complain of harassment before
they are sure that the conduct is, or soon will be, unlawful or even
inappropriate. Alternatively, what is more likely to result is that
employees will not report soon enough, and lose more sexual
harassment cases on summary judgment.'67 This will lead to more
complaints that may be dismissed as harmless. Such a scenario has
two negative results: first, a harassment complaint can harm an
alleged harasser's career and adversely impact his or her family life;
second, a proliferation of unsubstantiated harassment complaints
could fuel resentment and more discrimination in the workplace.
Based on the courts' treatment of employees reporting and failing
to report sexual harassment, it seems clear that the current affirmative
defense does not accomplish the goals and principles set forth by
Ellerth and Faragher. It makes little sense that employers whose
employees fail to report are entitled to the windfall benefit of the
affirmative defense, while employers who do more to encourage
complaints and respond properly to such allegations are denied the
defense. In addition to this anomalistic result, such a policy
encourages the undesirable behavior of trying to prevent employees
from using reporting procedures. Equally troubling is the courts'
practice of deciding against victims who delay their reports because
they attempted to resolve a situation informally or because they
needed time to work through such an undesirable workplace situation.
One way to encourage employers to eliminate sexual harassment is
to change the nature of the affirmative defense by eliminating its
second prong. The affirmative defense should focus exclusively on
employer conduct. To avoid vicarious liability, employers must
exercise reasonable care to prevent and to stop sexual harassment.
Employers should not have to prove that the employee acted
unreasonably. "Reasonable care" should consist of proscriptive
measures that both prevent sexual harassment and encourage-or, at
the very least, do not discourage-its reporting. In addition,
166. Harper, supra note 95, at 79.
167. An obvious potential domino effect is that courts might start requiring
handbooks and other personnel policies on sexual harassment reporting procedures
to specify that all reporting must be made within a certain number of weeks, or else
employees risk losing their claims based on Ellerth and Faragher.
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"reasonable care" should also be measured by how an employer
reacts to complaints of sexual harassment.'68
On its face, our proposed standard raises several questions that
warrant attention. What happens to the employee who waits three
months or even three years to complain? Under current law, the
employer's liability 169 is based on a determination by a judge or jury as
to whether such a delay is reasonable. 170 Alternatively, Professor
Harper argues that an employer should not be liable for conduct that,
if reported earlier, could have been prevented, but should be liable for
that which could not have been prevented under any circumstances.,
We advance a different approach and contend that employers should
be held liable for all harassment-whether the employee complained
after three days or even three years-if the employer failed to respond
to the complaint properly. Conversely, employers that properly
respond to complaints should be able to avoid liability. Thus,
employees would be under no undue time pressure to report
harassment before they were ready, and an employer's liability would
not be determined by an employee's decision whether to report.
Of course, our standard is far from perfect. It does, however,
improve the current rule, and it does so in a manner that satisfies the
broader goals expressed in the Ellerth and Faragher decisions. First,
our proposed approach eliminates the problem of rewarding
employers for employing individuals who are reluctant to report
harassment and penalizing employers for employing individuals that
report harassment promptly. This is particularly significant because
there is a strong argument, based on careful review of the cases
applying Ellerth and Faragher, that employers aiming to avoid liability
would be best served by not offering a hotline or other similar
methods of reporting harassment that are easy and anonymous. 72
Along similar lines, a careful analysis of the case law reveals that
employers would be well-advised not only to scrap the anonymous
reporting mechanisms, but also to eliminate or discontinue so-called
"sexual harassment training" programs for employees (but obviously
168. See Indest, 164 F.3d at 266.
169. This scenario assumes, of course, that the employer's proscriptive measures
constitute "reasonable care."
170. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
171. Harper, supra note 95, at 80-81 Hypothetically, according to Professor
Harper's theory, an employee who suffers an assault and is then subjected to
comments for the next three months before complaining would be able to recover for
the assault, but not the comments.
172. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such hotlines connect callers to a human-
resources specialist working in an office not associated with the reporting employee's
office. This alleviates the fear that rumors will circulate about the harassee's report.
and generally reduces the fear that other co-workers in the harassee's office will know
of his or her complaining. In turn, the anonymous nature of such hotlines makes
them extremely well-received, and they are generally an excellent avenue for
employees to report alleged harassment.
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not for managers) 173 that go above and beyond the reasonableness
necessary to win on an Ellerth- or Faragher-based motion. Moreover,
the Ellerth and Faragher progeny create an incentive for employers to
hire individuals who are unlikely to report harassment. In this era of
advanced personality testing and increasingly easy access to personal
background information, employers could invest in software programs
aimed at screening out potential reporters. This is an undesirable use
of resources that would be eliminated by our proposed standard.
Second, employees would not unintentionally undermine their
claims when they, in good faith, delay reporting or inadvertently
report to the wrong person. Instead, after employees report
harassment, only two facts would matter: (1) whether the employer
was notified of the alleged harassment, and, if so, (2) whether the
employer took the necessary and appropriate steps to correct the
behavior. Employers would not have to fear that sexual harassment
reports would automatically make their companies liable, and
employees would not feel pressured to report before they are ready.
Simply put, there are few logical reasons for courts to have to
determine what constitutes a "reasonable" delay.
There are two major problems with our proposed standard. The
first concerns an aspect of its application, while the second concerns
its viability. Neither problem, however, strikes us as insurmountable.
The first problem with such a standard lies in redress for victims. A
proper and timely employer response would, in some instances,
exonerate employers from certain forms of harassment that exposed
plaintiffs to an unconscionable amount of suffering. Thus, employees
raped by managers might not have a case under sexual harassment
laws. However, such aggrieved employees would still be able to file a
civil action for battery or emotional distress against an attacker.
Moreover, as the Indest court noted, employers are not strictly liable
for supervisors' actions. 4 Under the proposed standard, employers
would only be responsible if they unreasonably fail to prevent
harassment. Thus, employers would have a strong incentive to do
everything they could to ensure that harassment did not occur. In
addition, they would no longer have the negative incentive to exercise
a minimal amount of care that satisfies the judicial standard but
nonetheless results in an atmosphere that ultimately discourages
complaints.
The second problem involves how best to implement the standard.
Of course, the Supreme Court could refine Ellerth and Faragher, or
Congress could enact a statute. Until either event occurs, however,
there needs to be a rational justification for lower courts to apply our
173. Training managers should have no effect on the likelihood of employees
reporting, but may prevent unlawful conduct.
174. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d. 258, 266 (5thCir. 1999).
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proposed standard under the present law. One rationale is lodged
within the cases themselves, as we believe our standard follows from a
plausible reading of Ellerth and Faragher.
As the Indest court noted, in both Ellerth and Faragher, the
employees did not report the harassment to their employers before
they quit their jobs.175 Moreover, neither opinion directly addresses or
even alludes to the applicability of the defense when the employee
does in fact report.1 76 Thus, because neither Ellerth nor Faragher
applies the two-prong affirmative defense in a situation where the
employee reported, there is no reason for lower courts to be bound by
these decisions in such circumstances. Accordingly, lower courts are
free to apply a standard that best effectuates the purposes of Title VII
and other discrimination laws as set forth in the Ellerth and Faragher
opinions. Because both Faragher and Ellerth contend that Title VII is
supposed to encourage compliance, it makes sense to conclude that
the Court would never have enacted a defense that discourages
employers from enacting policies and procedures that would
encourage reporting and thus, help eliminate harassment.
At first glance, distinguishing cases in which an employee reports
harassment from the Ellerth and Faragher cases might resemble hair-
splitting. However, when one considers the legal consequences that
result from either applying or not applying the two-prong defense to
cases in which employees do file a report, it is clear that the Supreme
Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher were meant to apply only in
cases in which the employee did not file a report.
Applying the affirmative defense to cases in which the plaintiff
reports the harassment creates a perverse incentive for employers to
expend a limited amount of effort to combat sexual harassment. This
contradicts the Court's own conclusion that Title VII seeks to
encourage employers to comply with and enact policies and
procedures that help achieve this goal. Moreover, the logical
extension of this reading of Ellerth and Faragher suggests that the
existence of a policy satisfies the first prong, and an employee's failure
to report satisfies the second prong. We contend that the defense
should not apply to cases in which the plaintiff does report because (1)
the Court would never render a holding that creates perverse
incentives and compromise that which the court seeks to encourage,
and (2) the logical extension of such a holding contradicts the opinions
in the two cases.
In Faragher, the employer had a policy, but did not disseminate it.177
The Court held that this failure prevented the employer from proving
175. See id. at 265.
176. Justice Thomas's Ellerth dissent, however, does address this issue, and argues
that in such cases the employer would lose. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 773 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,782 (1998).
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both that it exercised reasonable care and that the plaintiff was
unreasonable. 178 In Ellerth, however, the company had a policy and
disseminated it.179 Despite this fact, the plaintiff failed to report the
harassment. 18° According to the vast majority of lower courts applying
the defense, these two facts would result in satisfaction of the defense
and dismissal of the case. The Court did not, however, dismiss
Ellerth's case. Instead, it remanded the case so that the lower court
could determine if the employer's policy constituted reasonable care,
and if the plaintiff's failure to report was unreasonable. The remand
suggests that the majority of courts misinterprets the defense by
holding that a policy and a failure to report amount to a victory for
employers as a matter of law. Instead, this holding implies (1) that the
first prong of the affirmative defense may require more than the mere
existence of a policy, and (2) that employees who do not report may
not always be unreasonable. If this is true, our reading of the Court's
opinions makes sense. The Court developed this defense for
situations in which an employee did not report; the Court did not
contemplate a situation in which the plaintiff-employee had reported.
Accordingly, lower courts are free to develop a new defense that
effectuates the purposes of both the discrimination laws and the
Ellerth and Faragher defense. The standard proposed here does just
that.
CONCLUSION
If employers did everything in their power to prevent sexual
harassment, would such harassment still persist? Regrettably, it
probably would. Should employers who do everything in their power
to prevent sexual harassment be held vicariously liable for the wholly
inappropriate conduct of a "cowboy" supervisor with an out-of-
control libido? Maybe, maybe not. It would not be in society's best
interest to hold employers strictly liable for such conduct, or to place a
greater burden on employers to screen out supervisors with
potentially harassing tendencies. This would be a logistical nightmare,
trigger undue costs, and still might not eliminate harassment. Simply
put, it would be impossible to systematically screen out such
individuals, and employers should not be held responsible to pay for
all the ills of society.
Assuming that employers should not be strictly liable, but unwilling
to follow a negligence standard, the Supreme Court arguably created
a regrettable situation when it articulated its two-prong affirmative
defense. Employers are held liable when they do all that they can to
prevent sexual harassment, but it nonetheless occurs and the
178. Id at 808.




employee reports it. They are liability-free, however, when they do a
lesser job of preventing harassment, and they happen to be fortuitous
enough to employ someone who fails to take reasonable steps to
report his or her claim.
As this article demonstrates, this dilemma leaves employers trying
to avoid liability with some rather uncomfortable guidance on how to
do so. First, it appears that an employer's entire effort to prevent
sexual harassment should be limited to enacting and disseminating an
anti-harassment policy. Employers should not engage in or should
eliminate extensive preventative efforts such as expensive sexual
harassment sensitivity training, or more particularly, harassment-
reporting hotlines. While such measures may have positive effects
such as reducing incidents of harassment, they could render
unavailable the affirmative defense if such measures encourage
employees to report. Because an employee's failure to report
harassment is considered to be "unreasonable," and because some
courts hold that employers cannot prevail if the employee reports,
employers seeking to limit liability have an incentive to do anything
lawful to discourage employees from reporting. This incentive
contradicts the purpose of the affirmative defense, which is to
encourage employers to take measures to discourage harassment and
to encourage employees to report all such incidents.
Second, employers now have an incentive to hire and retain
unreasonable employees. A prudent employer should invest the
money saved by eliminating harassment sensitivity training and the
harassment hotline into extensive background checking and
personality screening of applicants. Another problem with the
holding is that employees must report harassment before they are
comfortable doing so because a delay may extinguish their claims.
These incentives are clearly undesirable if the ultimate goal is to
eliminate or reduce sexual harassment in the workplace. This
Article's proposal of a revised standard for the affirmative defense
places greater emphasis on the employer's actions. This is one way to
avoid creating perverse employer incentives, and simultaneously to
increase prophylactic efforts to curb workplace harassment. Perhaps
most importantly, the proposed standard complies with a plausible
reading of Ellerth and Faragher, and better achieves the Supreme
Court's goals.
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